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1 Introduction 
Delay tolerant networks (DTNs) are becoming popular both in terrestrial and deep space 
environments as they maintain certain advantages over traditional internetworking 
protocols such as TCP/IP. DTN is an overlay on top of a number of heterogeneous 
networks including the internet (Ahmad et al., 2010). Differing from traditional networks, 
DTNs are distinguishably characterised by: 
a mobility and dynamic topology 
b high transmission delays 
c energy consumption 
d limited bandwidth 
e high bit-error rate 
f uncontrolled size of nodes. 
The constraints under which such networks function have severe effects making the 
adoption of a large number of security protocols and traditional solutions  
impossible. Moreover, in DTNs, the messages are disseminated according to the  
store-carry-and-forward principle. Although DTNs by their nature support high 
availability, they are not short of security-related challenges. Cryptographic key 
management is considered to be a challenging task in such networks and specifically in 
deep space communications because many mature and secure protocols are not practical 
in such environments. Naturally, poor or weak cryptographic key management will have 
an adverse effect on the cryptographic techniques which risk of being rendered insecure 
or inefficient (Zamani and Zubair, 2014). 
In a DTN setting, an end-to-end path between the source and the destination may not 
exist making routing in DTNs opportunistic. Conventional internet routing protocols are 
not suitable in a DTN as the end-to-end connectivity requirement is not necessarily 
satisfied. Despite the broad research on routing protocols in DTNs, very few consider 
security issues, whereas key management is not treated adequately. By exploiting the 
opportunity, whenever that arises, to exchange a key for future usage, end-to-end delay 
can be minimised over time. The purpose of this paper is to propose opportunistic key 
management (OKM) as a more suitable approach for key management in DTNs. We 
examine OKM using existing and popular protocols and we show that OKM is better 
exploited and utilised when used in conjunction with routing decisions by security aware 
DTN nodes. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the literature 
review and the current state of the art of key management and routing considering 
security aspects in DTNs. In Section 3, OKM is discussed as a more flexible approach for 
DTNs. This approach is based on the well-known scheduling and critical path methods 
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(CPMs). In Sections 4 and 5, we present the protocol parser we developed for the 
evaluation of our proposed method and the simulation results from a number of OKM 
scenarios. Finally, we conclude the paper with Section 6, where open issues and future 
word are summarised. 
2 Related work 
As mentioned earlier, cryptographic key management is considered to be a challenging 
problem in DTN environments. The difficulties and challenges are due to the peculiarities 
and constraints of the harsh communication conditions DTNs typically operate in, rather 
than the actual features of the underlying key management cryptographic protocols and 
solutions. The constraints of DTN environment make many good quality key 
management protocols described in literature unsuitable. Up to date, the literature has a 
relatively long domain of routing in DTNs but very few consider the security parameter. 
Key management and secure routing are important issues in DTNs, but solutions 
proposed to date tend to consider them separately. From a practical perspective such 
paradigm is limiting because security-based routing may be impractical since, due to the 
constraints of the DTN environment, a node may not possess the necessary cryptographic 
material needed to perform a cryptographic operation and complete a protocol run 
required for the underlying secure routing operation. The literature review is two-fold. 
The first part is about key management in DTNs and the second part is about  
security-aware routing in such networks. 
2.1 Key management in DTNs 
The literature has a plethora of fairly mature cryptographic key management protocols. A 
significant amount of work is published, were key management protocols are available 
most of which have been extensively analysed, with well-recognised security properties 
and acknowledged weaknesses. As such, the prohibiting factors relate to the practical 
communication, performance and efficiency aspects rather than the security capabilities 
of the key management protocols. 
Symington et al. (2014) and Birrane (2013) have explicitly excluded key management 
as it is a challenging topic. In Farrell et al. (2009), internet draft the author states a series 
of requirements for key management in DTNs too, without proposing a solution. The 
recent internet draft (Templin, 2015) proposes requirements and outlines a design for 
secure key management in DTNs. In addition, Templin (2014) states the key management 
problem in DTNs and emphasises that traditional security key management mechanisms 
are not always feasible in environments DTN typically operate in. 
Shikfa et al. (2012) propose a specific key management scheme for content-based 
opportunistic networks that enables the bootstrapping of local, topology-dependent 
security associations between a node and its neighbour along with the discovery of the 
neighbourhood topology. They achieve that by using pseudonym certificates and 
encapsulated signatures. In Menesidou and Katos (2012), one-pass key establishment 
protocol is used for authenticated key exchange in DTNs. More specifically, an adoption 
of Horsters-Michels-Petersen Protocol (HMP) is used for key establishment, while the 
protocol messages are injected in the bundle payload. In another work, Ding et al. (2013) 
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present an authentication and key agreement protocol with anonymity based on combined 
public key. Their protocol eliminates the need of public key digital certificate online 
retrieval and only an offline repository is needed. Djamaludin et al. (2013) build and 
compare different decentralised trust systems for implementation in autonomous DTN 
systems. They utilise a key distribution model based on the web of trust principle and 
compare it with two other decentralised methods. 
More recently, Bhutta et al. (2014) present an efficient and scalable key transport 
scheme (ESKTS) based on public key cryptography and proxy signatures. This scheme 
ensures that integrity and authentication is achieved at hop-by-hop level as well as  
end-to-end level. It also ensures end-to-end confidentiality and freshness for end 
communicating parties. Zhou et al. (2014) propose an autonomic group key  
management scheme for DTNs. Specifically, they present a logical key tree based on 
one-encryption-key multi decryption-key key protocol for group key management. In 
terms of efficiency, their scheme costs less than other proposed, making it more suitable 
for deep space DTNs. Moreover, Salem et al. (2014) propose a dynamic key distribution 
protocol for PKI-based VANETs. They also propose a key revocation mechanism that 
reduces the number of messages needed for revocation through certificate revocation list 
(CRL) distribution. 
2.2 Security-aware routing in DTNs 
As already highlighted, the literature contains an extensive study of routing in DTNs but 
very few consider security aspects. Xiaofeng et al. (2010) present an anti-localisation 
routing protocol (ALAR), to achieve anonymous delivery in DTNs. The proposed 
protocol can protect the sender’s location privacy through message fragmentation and 
forwarding each segment to different receivers. Their technique can lower the sender’s 
probability of being localised. However, the authors highlight that they did not consider 
the energy consumption, the proportion of sensitive messages and the distribution of the 
sensitive messages in their study. Pushpalakshmi and Kumar (2010), and Pushpalakshmi 
et al. (2011) present a secure minimised dominating set routing protocol for mobile  
ad hoc network (MANET) based on DTNs. In their technique, the messages are routed 
only to trustable nodes in minimised dominating set created by the trust level of the node, 
and the probability of future contacts. To deal with the effect of a potentially malicious 
node, trustworthiness of node can be taken into consideration in routing decision making. 
The work in Bulut and Szymanski (2011) focuses on the problem of routing in 
compromised DTNsin presence of malicious nodes. They discuss and analyse several 
message distribution schemes in terms of secure delivery of messages. Chen et al. (2012) 
present a dynamic trust management protocol for secure routing optimisation in DTN 
environments in the presence of well-behaved, selfish and malicious nodes. To analyse 
their protocol, they use stochastic Petri net (SPN) techniques and to validate it they use 
simulation. Haigang and Lingfei (2013) present the state-of-the-art of routing protocols in 
delay tolerant mobile networks (DTMNs). They also admit that there is a little study on 
security in DTMSs and they discuss and accept security-considered routing as an open 
issue. Moreover, in Ramesh et al. (2013), a routing protocol that provides security in the 
intermittently connected mobile networks is proposed, while the routing performance 
metrics are not degraded with the implementation of the security mechanism. Their 
routing mechanism aids in detecting and preventing intrusion of malicious nodes. Vrinda 
and Arun (2014) have implemented a trust and reputation management mechanism. Their 
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mechanisms serve to ensure secure communication and isolates malicious nodes which 
may attack the network and reduces network performance in terms of reliability and 
security. Last but not least, Jadhav et al. (2015) utilise a time-evolving topology model 
and two-channel cryptography to design an efficient and non-interactive key exchange 
protocol. The time-evolving model is used to model predetermined behaviour of space 
DTNs. The two-channel cryptography enables DTN nodes to exchange their public keys 
and status information, whilst offering authentication and in a non-interactive fashion. 
3 Security aware routing and OKM 
3.1 Security aware routing – path selection 
In this paper, we argue that key management is better exploited and utilised when used in 
conjunction with routing decisions by security aware DTN nodes. We adopt the CPM as 
a decision making method for different paths between source and destination. CPM is 
used for activities scheduling in project management. The duration for each activity is the 
end-to-end delay. The critical path represents the most costly, in terms of delay, path. 
Security aware nodes can exploit the slack time, between the critical path and the selected 
path, for security and key management tasks. 
Figure 1 Security aware routing (see online version for colours) 
 
The following simple scenario illustrates the approach. We assume two different paths 
(p1 and p2) with stable bandwidth (b1 and b2) from source to destination. Connection with 
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path 1 starts at t1 and with path 2 at t2. The transmission delay is the volume of data to be 
sent divided by the bandwidth. Assuming further that queuing delay is negligible, total 
end-to-end delay (d1 and d2, respectively) can be expressed as the propagation delay plus 
the transmission and the processing delay. Cryptographic delay (that is, delay due to the 
necessary cryptographic operations required by the underlying cryptographic protocol) is 
included in the processing delay. 
- -     End to end delay Propagation delay Transmission delay Processing delay= + +  
The maximum value between the sum of start time and end-to-end delay of the two paths 
represents the critical path. Figure 1 represents the aforementioned scenario. 
The following equation represents the more efficient path selection based on the 
critical path. 
2 2 1 1
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 if
2 if
1 or 2 if
x
x t d t d
P x t d t d
x t d t d
= + > +⎧⎪= = + > +⎨⎪ = + = +⎩
 
The slack time is calculated by the difference of the two end-to-end delays, in case we 
select the most efficient in terms of delay path. Slack time can be utilised to run security 
tasks. 
1 1 2 2SlackTime t d t d= + − +  
3.2 OKM – security task selection 
Traditional security key management mechanisms are not always feasible due to 
operational limitations of huge delays. Bhutta et al. (2009) mention that a single key 
management scheme might not be sufficient for DTN networks due to heterogeneity of 
networks, like satellite networks, sensor networks and so forth. Consequently, a more 
complete framework would be required to provide key management services. In many 
cases, this can be addressed by a public key infrastructure (PKI) that has a number of 
geographically distributed certificate authorities (CA) in order to ensure that private key 
holders maintain valid keys and are properly authorised. In DTNs, a direct path between 
the source and destination does not always exist. Such a constraint makes routing in 
DTNs opportunistic. Based on the same idea, we propose OKM. 
Key management-related processes can be executed whenever an opportunity arises 
which could be due to an idle node or slack time. In many environments requiring DTN 
solutions, the DTN nodes have plenty of opportunities to stay idle for a considerable 
amount of time. Nodes can exploit the unused bandwidth by updating their information 
from CA, run key exchange protocols for future use or perform necessary operations for 
key management. A security-aware node will check the existence of security tasks, 
prioritise them and finally schedule the most critical task. A security-aware node can 
estimate the number of needed session keys based on the connectivity, RTT, established 
keys, available protocols and usage rate. It is self-evident that communication with 
already established session key has less end-to-end delay compared to nodes that have 
first to establish a new one. 
Furthermore, a good practice is to run more than one key exchange protocol 
simultaneously with opportunistic batch key confirmation; the more passes a protocol 
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has, the more end-to-end delay it adds. There is a plethora of key exchange protocols 
(e.g., MQV, KEA, etc.) where the last pass is not necessary for the key exchange phase 
but it is used for key confirmation. For instance, an idle node has time to exchange ten 
session keys using the first pass of MQV protocol and the connection is lost before the 
second passes of key confirmation. The rest of the messages can be accumulated and sent 
later in time when there is new connection and opportunity, while the session keys are 
already in use. By using opportunistically batch key confirmation, the extra added cost of 
delay is minimised. 
In addition, every security-aware node must distinguish and prioritise its forthcoming 
needs and to select the most urgent and critical one when the opportunity arises. The keys 
may have lifetimes associated with them, requiring refresh or replacement upon expiry. 
These keys and policies must be managed and there must be a mechanism to distribute, 
refresh, and revoke the keys and policies (Ivancic, 2010). For instance, CAs issue a 
signed data structure called a CRL. Every node must be able to acquire the new issued 
CRL. Based on the priorities of the node’s security policy, the current needs and the 
remaining time before the operation expires, the node must be able to select the most 
suitable operation. The current needs of a node depend on the current status of a node. A 
typical security aware node task list is as follows: 
• Certificate renewal – The node can start the certificate renewal phase by creating and 
replacing the old certificate with a new one or by updating the same certificate. 
Typically, a certificate expires after one or more years. In addition, a good practice is 
the renewed certificate be issued and published at least 1 week prior to the expiration 
of the certificate it replaces. 
• CRL update – A new CRL is issued on a regular periodic basis. For instance, due to 
the huge delays in DTNs, a weekly update could be a good approach. This task can 
also be combined, if there is available bandwidth, with another necessary 
information from CA (e.g., missing certificates retrieval). 
• Missing certificates retrieval – When there is a missing certificate (e.g., an expired, a 
revoked or a not acquired certificate) the node can retrieve it from the CA. More 
specifically, in deep space DTNs, the connectivity to a neighbour node would be 
known if a contact graph routing (CGR) is present. In addition, each node can keep a 
list with the neighbour’s missing certificates and based on the available bandwidth 
and the connectivity the node can retrieve them from the CA. This task, when it is 
feasible, can also be combined with the CRL Update. 
• Establish session keys – Every node can maintain a list of a number of established 
session keys and the usage rate per neighbour node. Based on this information, the 
node will be able to establish more session keys before all the keys are used. 
Moreover, the accumulated key confirmation passes of previous runs of key 
exchange protocols can also be scheduled. 
In the proposed framework, a security-aware node will be able to prioritise and analyse 
these security tasks to find the most critical one and this will be done by employing CPM 
practices. As such, the node will be able determine which tasks are critical and which can 
be delayed without managing thus end-to-end delays. 
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3.2.1 CPM in OKM exemplar 
Consider a setup of four nodes, namely A,B,C,D and a separate node running a CA.  
Node A is currently idle, has three neighbours (B, C, D) and a CA neighbour. In addition, 
based on the CGR the next connection with CA starts in 30 minutes and with nodes B, C 
and D starts in 0 minutes, 15 minutes and 1 hour respectively. The RTT delay ranges 
between 15 minutes to 1 hour. The session key usage rate between node A and the rest of 
the nodes B, C and D are 0.5, 0.05 and 0.05 keys/sec, respectively. We also assume that 
for session key establishment one pass key exchange protocol is used. Table 1 
summarises all the aforementioned contact information for node A. 
In addition, the current status of node A is: 
• node’s A certificate expires in 7 days and minutes 
• CRL expires in 2 hours 
• 2 certificates are stored locally 
1 node’s B certificate expires in 2 hours 15 minutes 
2 node’s C certificate expires in 3 hours 
3 node’s D certificate is missing 
• 900 session keys are stored locally 
1 450 session keys are established with node B 
2 450 session keys are established with node C 
3 0 session keys are established with node D. 
Table 1 Node’s A contact information 
Nodes Connection start RTT sKey usage rate 
CA 30 min 15 min - 
B 0 min 30 min 0.5 keys/sec 
C 15 min 60 min 0.05 keys/sec 
D 60 min 30 min 0.05 keys/sec 
The question is which operation is more suitable to take place first. The security tasks 
(activities) node A must perform are: 
1 Renew certificate from CA – The activity can start when the connection with CA 
starts (30 minutes). The duration is the same with the RTT (15 minutes). The activity 
must finish 7 days before certificate expiration (45 minutes). 
2 Update CRL from CA – The activity can start when the connection with CA starts 
(30 minutes). The duration is the same with the RRT (15 minutes). The activity must 
finish before CRL expiration (120 minutes). 
3 AKE with node B (old certificate) – The activity can start when the connection with 
node B starts (0 minutes). The duration is half the RTT because we have one-pass 
key exchange protocol (15 minutes). The activity must finish before established 
session keys are finished (15 minutes) and before expiration of the certificate  
(135 minutes). 
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4 Retrieve node’s B certificate from CA – The activity can start when the connection 
with CA starts (30 minutes). The duration is the same with the RTT (15 minutes). 
The activity must finish before expiration of the new certificate (1 year). Activity 4 
must follow activity 3. 
5 AKE with node B (new certificate) – The activity can start when the connection with 
node B starts (0 minutes) and activity 4 is finished. The duration is half the RTT 
because we have one-pass key exchange protocol (15 minutes). The activity must 
finish before expiration of the new certificate (1 year). Activity 5 must follow 
activities 1 and 4. 
6 AKE with node C (old certificate) – The activity can start when the connection with 
node C starts (15 minutes). The duration is half the RTT because we have one-pass 
key exchange protocol (30 minutes). The activity must finish before established 
session keys are finished (150 minutes) and before expiration of the certificate  
(180 minutes). 
7 Retrieve node’s C certificate from CA – The activity can start when the connection 
with CA starts (30 minutes) and activity 6 is finished. The duration is the same with 
the RTT (15 minutes). The activity must finish before expiration of the new 
certificate (1 year). Activity 7 must follow activity 6. 
8 AKE with node C (new certificate) – The activity can start when the connection with 
node C starts (15 minutes) and activity 7 is finished. The duration is half the RTT 
because we have one-pass key exchange protocol (30 minutes). The activity must 
finish before expiration of the new certificate (1 year). Activity 8 must follow 
activities 1 and 7. 
9 Retrieve node’s D certificate from CA – The activity can start when the connection 
with CA starts (30 minutes). The duration is the same with the RTT (15 minutes). 
The activity must finish before expiration of the new certificate (1 year). 
10 AKE with node D – The activity can start when the connection with node D starts 
(60 minutes) and activity 9 is finished. The duration is half the RTT because we have 
one-pass key exchange protocol (15 minutes). Activity 10 must follow activity 9. 
Table 2 Node’s A security activities 
Activities of node A Start End Duration 
1 Renew certificate from CA 0:30 0:45 15 min 
2 Update CRL from CA 0:30 2:00 15 min 
3 AKE with node B (old certificate) 0:00 0:15 15 min 
4 Retrieve node’s B certificate from CA 0:30 1 year 15 min 
5 AKE with node B (new certificate) After activity 4 1 year 15 min 
6 AKE with node C (old certificate) 0:15 2:30 30 min 
7 Retrieve node’s C certificate from CA After activity 6 1 year 15 min 
8 AKE with node C (new certificate) After activity 7 1 year 30 min 
9 Retrieve node’s D certificate from CA 0:30 1 year 15 min 
10 AKE with node D After Activity 9 1 year 15 min 
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Figure 2 Activity network and critical path (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 3 Gantt chart (see online version for colours) 
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Table 2 summarises all the security activities of node A together with the start time, end 
time and duration. The start time and the duration are based on the RTT, the session key 
usage rate and the connectivity. The first step is to create the activity network diagram 
(see Figure 2) to see the activity dependencies and to identify the critical path. The 
critical path is depicted with red line. 
The next step is to create, the Gantt chart (see Figure 3) which could be proved 
helpful to see an overall view of all the security activities. Now, node A has a complete 
idea which task is more urgent to do first. The critical path is presented too, with dotted 
lines. 
4 Protocol parser 
A protocol parser was developed to support the evaluation of more complex scenarios of 
security-aware routing decisions (see Figure 4) and to evaluate the proposed concept of 
OKM. The main goal of the parser is to automate the comparison of various protocols 
and scenarios, although the underlying functionality can be included in a DTN node to 
add advanced decision making capabilities on routing. The parser will recommend 
injection of additional protocols in the case of missing security parameters. More 
specifically, message length, number of passes, network topology, access to certificates 
and keys are analysed in order to produce a ns-2 script for simulation. In addition, the 
protocol language has been enriched with a cryptographic delay per byte of information 
parameter, which will be passed on to the DTN agent (Vardalis, 2014). The parser 
supports import/export in xml format to facilitate integration with other tools and to allow 
an effective design of scenarios. The supported xml format is depicted in Figure 5 where 
the introduced xml tags – namely routing, nodes, name and messages – define the 
corresponding areas in the parser. In this example, we can see the scenario of the  
two-pass MQV key agreement protocol between nodes A and B. From nodes, we can see 
the bandwidth (downlink/uplink), the node’s credentials (e.g., access to private and 
public keys) and the message between the nodes. 
Table 3 AKA protocol comparison 
 HMP MQV STS 
Fundamental security goals    
 Implicit key authentication Y Y Y 
 Explicit key authentication N N Y 
Desirable security attributes    
 Known-key security N N Y 
 Forward secrecy N N Y 
 Key-compromise impersonation - N (Chalkias et al., 2011) Y 
 Unknown key-share - N+ (Chalkias et al., 2011) N 
Desirable performance attributes    
 Minimal number of passes 1 2 3 
Source: Menesidou and Katos (2012) 
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Figure 4 Protocol parser (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 5 MQV Scenario in XML format (see online version for colours) 
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5 Evaluation 
A number of scenarios, described in the following subsections, were created to assess the 
added value of security-aware routing, the efficiency of OKM and specifically of  
pre-established necessary keys. Initially the scenarios were created and fed through the 
protocol parser. The latter produced outputs in the form of tcl scripts that were in turn fed 
to ns-2 and specifically to the DTN agent for ns-2 (Vardalis, 2014) that was used for the 
simulation. The performance metric is the end-to-end delay which is defined as  
the time taken for a bundle to be transmitted across a network from source to  
destination. It involves propagation delay, transmission delay, and cryptographic delay 
(encryption/decryption). For the simulations TCP was used as the convergence layer. 
5.1 Number of established session keys 
In this scenario, a custodian node A (source) wants to forward data to node B 
(destination). While node B is waiting for the data from node A, OKM is used. More 
specific, multiple key exchange protocols are established between idle nodes B and C for 
future use. The bandwidth used for all the available paths are 0.1 Mbps and the 
propagation delay is 10 minutes, which is a typical value for space DTNs. We calculated 
how many session keys can be established for different volume of data and for three 
different key exchange protocols. The authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols we 
selected for comparison are the one-pass HMP, the MQV and the STS protocol.  
Table 3, adopted from Menesidou and Katos (2012) present the three selected protocols 
against the definitions and requirements for authenticated key establishment from  
Blake-Wilson and Menezes (1999). 
Figure 6 Number of established session keys (see online version for colours) 
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Figure 6 presents the number of possible exchanged session keys, while node B is 
waiting for the data from node A. However, the number of stored session keys depends 
on the available storage, the remaining energy of each node and the usage rate. From 
Table 3 and Figure 6, the trade-off between efficiency and security is evident as we can 
establish that STS is more secure but HMP is more efficient. 
Figure 7 Number of established session keys (3D) (see online version for colours) 
 
By counting the huge delays in deep space communications, DTN nodes will be idle most 
of the time and consequently the established session keys will be enough to minimise the 
imposed delay of the key exchange phase. The idle node will be able to predict which key 
exchange protocol is better for each situation based on the usage rate, the security policy 
and the protocol suit. The same scenario has been extended for two more different 
bandwidth values 0.5 Mb and 1 Mb. The surface graph in Figure 6 highlights the 
efficiency of HMP protocol as the waiting phase of the idle node and the bandwidth are 
increasing. 
Table 4 Security aware routing simulation scenario parameters 
 Path 1 (A-B-D) Path 2 (A-C-D) 
Start time (sec) 600 sec 0 sec 
Data to send 10–70 MB 10–70 MB 
Bandwidth 10 Mbps 1 Mbps 
Propagation delay 0.1 sec 0.1 sec 
A–B 90 keys A–C 80 keys Number of established keys 
B–D many keys C–D many keys 
Usage rate 10 keys/sec 10 keys/sec 
Cryptographic protocol STS HMP 
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Figure 8 Security aware routing decision (message injection vs. OKM) (see online version  
for colours) 
 
5.2 Security-aware routing decision 
In this scenario, we compare two different paths between node A (source) and node D 
(destination). Specifically, we assume path 1: A-B-D and path 2: A-C-D with 10 Mbps 
and 1 Mbps bandwidth, respectively. In both paths confidentiality is a security 
requirement. Path 1 is available after 10 minutes and path 2 is available now. Moreover, 
the propagation delay is 100 ms. All node pairs have already established session keys by 
a previous run of OKM and the 128-bit AES algorithm will be used for encryption. 
Between nodes B, D and C, D many session keys established with OKM. Between  
nodes A, B and A, C, 90 and 80 session keys are established with 10 keys/sec usage rate. 
In addition, node A supports STS and HMP protocols for key exchange, node B supports 
only STS protocol and node C supports only HMP. Table 4 summarises the simulation 
parameters and in Figure 8 we can see the trade-off between end-to-end delay and 
cryptographic delay before and after AKA protocol message injection for new session 
keys establishment. The injection phase starts when the previously established session 
keys are finished. As expected, end-to-end delay is minimised when is used OKM. 
6 Conclusions and future work 
In this paper, we have attempted to address the challenging task of cryptographic key 
management in opportunistic networks by incorporating security awareness in routing. 
The idea of OKM in DTNs is introduced. It was shown that a systematic prioritisation of 
security tasks can help to effectively control end-to-end delays. For our simulations, the 
DTN-agent for ns-2 is used to run various scenarios. We also identified that OKM can 
result in more efficient security aware routing. 
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Ongoing future efforts include the further development of the parser to enable the 
implementation of more complex scenarios of various opportunistic networks, other than 
space DTNs, as well as the inclusion of more parameters that influence the prioritisation 
and execution of security activities. These parameters include the available storage, the 
remaining energy of the node and the usage rate, and will affect, among others, the 
number of protocol runs and session keys stored by the node. Another plan for future 
work is to identify which key establishment protocol will provide the better efficiency vs. 
security trade-off. Finally, an area of ongoing research is the integration of the proposed 
OKM with an existing testbed in order to empirically evaluate it. 
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